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Abstract: This article argues that different types of politically motivated violence in 
South Asia are associated with different forms of governance and relationships 
between society and the state. This variation in local governance in turn is the product 
of unevenness in state formation across the political geography of India. It classifies 
conflict events in India in 2015 and 2016 into conceptual categories of sovereignty-
neutral and sovereignty-challenging, theoretically reflecting the commonsense 
distinction between riots and rebellion. It presents evidence that different categories 
of state-society regimes at the district level are associated with different patterns of 
sovereignty-neutral and -challenging violence. It finds that urban-adjacent hegemonic 
state-society regimes are associated with high levels of sovereignty-neutral violence, 
revised state-society regimes with of traditionally restrained state capacity are 
associated with high levels of sovereignty-challenging violence, with fragmented and 
accommodative regimes in the agrarian hinterland are associated with intermediary 
positions in both categories.   
 
 	   	  
Political and social violence is rife in South Asia. Scholars have sought explanations 
for this violence in the competition over resources, ethnic and social grievances, the 
absence of social capital, electoral incentives and physical geographies that might 
make violent conflict feasible. But the study of internal violence in the Indian 
subcontinent is deeply bifurcated. Some scholars seek to explain the prevalence, 
intensity, character and duration of the multiple internal wars and insurgencies in 
India, Pakistan and, until recently, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Others attempt to understand 
violence among religious, ethnic or sectarian groups, in which the object of violence 
is usually not the state but other communities, and violent clashes and reprisals occur 
instead of armed conflict. Due to sub-disciplinary boundaries within the scholarship 
on political conflict, these two categories are rarely, if ever, incorporated within a 
single framework.  
This article proposes such a framework, focusing on the spatial distribution of 
different forms of violence in India. To do so, I make a principal distinction in forms 
of violence based on the intentions, and related repertoires, of violent conflict, 
building theoretically on the commonsense difference between riots and rebellion. 
When state and non-state actors clash over the basic legitimacy of the state in a 
particular area, I term this sovereignty-challenging violence. When violence is 
deployed between and among communities to discretely influence policy, mobilize 
electoral support or settle scores within a fundamentally unchallenged structure of 
state power, I term this sovereignty-neutral violence.  
The political geography of violent conflict in India reveals patterns that 
suggest that these two types of violence might be causally connected. With some 
notable exceptions, areas with high incidence of insurgency typically have low 
incidence of social violence, and vice-versa. In this article, I argue that the nature of 
state capacity and the state’s relationships with society provide a coherent conceptual 
framework that can explain the geographic dispersion of sovereignty-challenging and 
-neutral violence in India.  
 More broadly, I contend that the unevenness of the capacity of the Indian state 
across its national territory is a significant cause of the patterns of politically-
motivated violent conflict. Such unevenness is a legacy of processes of state 
formation during the colonial era, in which the government privileged concrete 
strategic goals over the establishment of uniform standards of authority within its 
borders. Due to these processes, the Indian subcontinent under colonial rule became a 
patchwork of heterogeneous sovereignties, suzerainties and zones of administrative 
neglect (Naseemullah and Staniland 2016). As India achieved independence, the 
scope of state power over territory increased, as the government sought to knit 
together diverse territories into a coherent system of national authority. Yet the 
unevenness of the state’s presence across its territory has persisted in practice. Some 
areas approach Weberian sovereignty, whereas in others, the state is all but absent. 
This leads to dramatically different relationships between the state and social actors 
across India’s political geography, which in turn can shape discrete types of conflict. 
In spaces where the state is omnipresent, the state’s coercive and 
infrastructural powers are seen to overwhelm any rival governance actors, and the 
population looks exclusively to the government for the provision of key public and 
social goods. Control of the apparatus of government is thus essential for material 
progress, and groups compete to gain or retain state power to access its resources and 
rents, often through violent means. I argue that in these hegemonic regimes, 
associated with metropolitan governance or proximity to cities and towns, we see 
higher incidence of sovereignty-neutral violence and little sovereignty-challenging 
violence.  
In spaces where the state apparatus at the local level is traditionally weak or 
even wholly absent, government actors might not have everyday coercive capacities 
necessary to preempt or interdict rebellion. But further, the long-term weakness of the 
state’s capacity to provide key social goods, including a monopoly of violence, 
undermines the authority of the state and encourages populations who feel 
underserved by the government to seek alternatives. Social groups seeking to fill this 
void are as likely to compete with or struggle against the state itself over political 
authority as to engage with it, particularly when the state or its capitalist clients 
choose to latterly reassert their authority coercively in response to economic 
opportunities or security mandates. In these revised regimes, we see high incidence of 
sovereignty-challenging violence.  
Finally, in India’s vast agricultural hinterland, intermediate fragmented and 
accommodative regimes present profiles of violence that are conditioned by whether 
commercialization has led to local contestation over the state’s power and resources. 
The presence and authority of the state, and the relationship it has with society at the 
local level, can provide a more comprehensive explanation for the complex landscape 
of violence in India than forms of violence taken apart, and may be helpful for 
understanding the relationships between state capacity and violence in other post-
colonial countries. 
This article proceeds as follows. First, I outline the extant literature on the 
geography of violence in India, noting the bifurcation between studies of riots and of 
insurgencies; I then present a framework and associated evidence that aims to 
integrate the two. Second, I introduce a typology of governance regimes, based on 
colonial state-building strategies, that explores the roots of variation in state-society 
relations and their impacts on violence. Third, I present empirical evidence for the 
relationship between state-society regimes and forms of violence in contemporary 
India. The article concludes with some reflections on the theoretical link between 
state capacity, sovereignty and conflict in India and beyond.   
 
FORMS OF VIOLENCE IN INDIA 
 
Since independence, India has had various, sustained episodes of internal violence. 
The roots of some of these episodes can be traced back to practices of colonial 
governance. Practices of primitive accumulation and repression gave rise to peasant 
insurgencies, and many argue that policies that created divisions among religious 
communities led to the violence that preceded and accompanied Partition (Guha, 
1983; Aiyer, 1995; Kennedy and Purushotham, 2012). The context of Indian 
independence itself – widespread communal violence, the coercive integration of 
princely states and early interstate competition over the princely state of Kashmir – 
marred an otherwise relatively peaceful process of decolonization, with an orderly 
transition of administrative and representative institutions, achieved without an armed 
struggle.   
 Endemic violence has persisted well beyond independence, however. As the 
post-colonial state established itself, new challenges to its security and legitimacy 
emerged. Many of these were initially understood within the general rubric of 
political instability accompanying modernization (Huntington, 1968; Gurr, 1970). 
Rising disorder in India was associated with the decline of the Congress Party as a 
cohesive, programmatic institution capable of mediating the demands of an aspirant, 
restive and fragmented population (Rudoph and Rudolph, 1987; Kohli, 1990). 
 Over time, two divergent perspectives of internal violence emerged. The first 
concerned challenges to the fundamental security of the Indian state by insurrections 
seeking to challenge it in particular national geographies. Analysts have sought to 
explain these challenges within a broader framework within security studies of the 
causes of civil war. The second has sought to understand contentious or violent inter-
group relations in multiethnic democracies such as India, highlighting the importance 
of identity for political mobilization and intergroup competition. The two research 
programs unintentionally obscure one another’s insights, however, because of 
disciplinary and sub-disciplinary divisions in the study of political conflict that 
separate insurgencies and riots into subjects of international relations and comparative 
politics, respectively. The result is two conceptually distinct geographies of political 
conflict that are rarely considered together.  
Insurgencies 
 
From the 1980s onward, internal wars in developing countries have been established 
as a central object of enquiry for conflict and security studies through a belief that 
state failure presents a clear danger to international security. In India, serious 
challenges to the Weberian monopoly of coercion in its periphery coexist alongside a 
strong, powerful state apparatus that is in little danger of collapsing. Thus, scholars 
have applied case-specific and cross-national theories of civil war onset, intensity and 
duration to the continent-sized case of India not to predict total state breakdown, but 
rather for assessing where territorial insurgencies were likely to occur and why. 
 Two broad approaches have guided the study of major intrastate conflict, in 
India as elsewhere. The first, reflecting the notion that violent politics after the cold 
war would likely be conducted on ethnic lines (Chua, 2002), is that of the violent 
expression of political grievances among ethnic groups in plural societies, particularly 
those with significant “horizontal inequalities” (Horowitz, 1985; Stewart, 2008; 
Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). The second argues that internal conflict is 
more likely where insurgent conflict is more feasible: in places in which the coercive 
capacity of the state is too weak to forestall or interdict rebellion, features of physical 
geography enable guerrilla warfare against superior forces, and the presence of 
alienable resources fuel conflict against the state (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier; 
Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009).1  
 These explanations go a long way to explaining the nature and spatial 
variation of insurgencies in India. Ethnic separatist rebellions in Punjab in the 1980s 
and in India’s northeast – and implicitly among tribal-majority regions of the “Red 
corridor” and the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley – arise out of a latent sense of 
group-based inequity, combined with ethnic outbidding by political entrepreneurs and 
the failure (or willful disruption) of ethnic management mechanisms in India’s 
constitutional structure (Kohli, 1997; Ganguly, 1999; Lacina, 2009). And 
securitization discourses themselves underplay the real and heartfelt grievances of 
those who find themselves trapped in conflicts between paramilitaries and insurgents 
(Peer, 2008; Pandita, 2011). Further, insurgencies throughout South Asia take 
advantage of mountains and forests in national peripheries and hinterlands from 
which to wage guerrilla warfare on the state (Gawande, Kapur and Satyanath, 2015; 
Johnson and Mason, 2008). In the case of Kashmir, material and logistic support that 
has been provided to rebels by a foreign power reflects the increased viability of 
rebellions with cross-border sanctuaries and sponsors (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; 
Staniland, 2005).  
 Yet these explanations overlap in their predictions of where insurgent conflict 
is likely to occur, almost to the point of over-determination; forested and mountainous 
regions are also places in which minority populations, with ethnic grievances, are 
estranged from the largesse of the state. But these explanations present a partial view 
of the geographies of violence in India, and the politics behind them, for three 
reasons. First, research on insurgencies necessarily select on the dependent variable 
by exploring the exceptional circumstance within which armed rebellions arise; 
theories that explain extreme outcomes are in general less effective at explaining 
variation across the universe of violent cases. Second, insurgent conflict in these 
exceptional geographies does not imply the absence of violence in other spaces, in 
India’s heartland. Rather, these are prone to different forms of internal violence. 
Third, despite notable exceptions (Staniland, 2017), insurgencies are often studied 
through a security lens that regularly denudes armed struggles of their political 
meaning, which in turn naturalizes a false dichotomy between political violence and 
intrastate armed conflict, thus enforcing a conceptual separation between the 
exceptional and the quotidian in the geographies of violence.  
Riots 
 
In India, social violence – the violent contention by social groups against others or 
against government actors with such objectives such as policy change, electoral 
mobilization or the capture of rents – is often brought under the rubric of ‘riots.’ 
Horowitz (2001: 1) defined ethnic riot as “an intense, sudden, though not necessarily 
wholly unplanned, lethal attack by civilian members of one ethnic group on civilian 
members of another ethnic group, the victims chosen because of their group 
membership.” Riots have connotations of spontaneous outbursts of violence among 
crowds, whether against the police or other groups; these were originally thought to 
be expressions of criminality or reaction to popular frustrations (Gurr 1970). Brass 
(1997) has, however, argued that ethnic riots in India often involve a complex, latent 
arrangement of violent actors and institutions that can be activated by political 
entrepreneurs when required, to achieve discrete objectives. A key actor in riot 
contexts – beyond instigators, rioters and victims – is the everyday state. Wilkinson 
(2004; 2009: 336) has argued that quotidian state actors such as police forces, if they 
have the right orders – and thus their political masters have the political incentives – 
usually have the capability to forestall or end riots; in other words, riots occur with 
the state’s tacit permission (or active support).  
Although there are several different targets of social violence in India, a deep, 
wide-ranging academic debate has existed on the causes of riot-based ethnic conflict 
between Hindus and Muslims, particularly after a wave of violence following the 
destruction of the Babri Masjid by Hindu nationalist groups in December 1992. 
Varshney (2003) argued that Indian cities with longstanding traditions of social 
capital that bridge communities experienced peace, whereas those lacking this form of 
social capital experienced interethnic violence. Wilkinson (2004) argued that while 
local political actors might wish to instigate riots to mobilize the electorate at the 
constituency level, state governments – when relying on minority support in electoral 
coalitions – deploy the state’s coercive force to prevent riots from occurring or halt 
them in their early stages.  
 The success of this specific research agenda has, however, thrown a large 
shadow over other forms and targets of social violence. Importantly, it excludes riot-
based violence against other ethnic communities, and thus other dynamics. Veena Das 
(1995) studied the microdynamics of the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi in 1984 following the 
assassination of Indira Gandhi, in which more than 2,500 were killed over four days; 
she argued that the targeting of a Sikh neighborhood was the result of local politics 
among community leaders. But the targeting of Christians by Hindu extremists in 
Orissa, or Muslims by Buddhist gangs in Ladakh, is rarely reported, let alone studied. 
Social violence between caste-based groups in rural areas – particularly between 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) over land and 
employment relations –is similarly obscured (Narula, 1999). More recently, Patidars 
in Gujarat and Jats in Haryana have clashed violently with the police over state 
governments’ refusal to classify them as “backward” in relation to India’s policies of 
affirmative action (Jaffrelot, 2015). Much recent social violence using the repertoires 
of riots is explicitly electoral, with the supporters of rival political parties or 
associated organizations, implicated in local mafias, clashing ahead of national and 
regional elections (Staniland, 2015).  
 Social violence, particularly executed through the repertoire of riots, is not 
unstudied in India, but the tools, data and concepts related to social violence are 
specific and tend to clash with those of insurgent violence, preventing any integrated 
geography of violence from being formulated. Part of this is because the data that 
could populate this landscape is politically fraught. Official government data on riots 
and other forms of social violence, aggregated from charge sheets, are subject to 
systematic underreporting (Wilkinson, 2009: 331). In insurgent-prone areas, by 
contrast, government actors and journalists face different incentives and challenging 
constraints.  
The level of analysis for social violence is defined by the explanatory leverage 
of the theory in question, whether it involves wards within a city neighborhood, in a 
paired comparison of cities or at the state level. This spatial flexibility is enormously 
important for internal validity, but it does present some difficulty in mapping violence 
more systematically across India, particularly away from urban areas. Different forms 
of social violence occur in different geographies; as Varshney and Wilkinson have 
demonstrated, Hindu-Muslim riots tend to occur in cities, but focusing on 
municipalities – and the specifically urban political geographies in which they are 
integrated (Gupte, 2017) – to the exclusion of rural areas tends to underemphasize 
caste-based violence, which is much more likely to occur in the countryside, let alone 
insurgent violence in peripheries and hinterlands. 
Integrating Riots and Insurgencies  
 
While the separation in social science research between internal war and social 
violence is explicable, it does limit our capacity to assess the causes and 
consequences of different modes of conflict within a common national territory, 
theoretically governed by the same state apparatus. How can one national politics – or 
even different regional politics with common institutional frameworks – create 
radically different sorts of violence? Why are the methods and objectives of violent 
actors so different across the geography of India? In integrating riot-like and 
insurgency-like conflict into one geography of political violence, we might start 
answering these questions.  
 A useful starting point is to classify violence in relation to the closely 
associated concept of sovereignty. Max Weber’s (1991 [1919]) definition of the state, 
and perforce its ultimate authority embodied in the concept of sovereignty, is that of 
an organization with a monopoly of legitimate use of force within a particular 
territory. Charles Tilly’s (1985) framework of European state formation sees the 
deployment and legitimation of violence as integral to the building of strong capable 
sovereign states, to expand territories, extract resources and eliminate domestic 
competitors. But in the developing world in the postwar era, in which borders were 
defined by colonial powers and fixed by international norms, conflict both internal or 
external to the state has rarely led to the establishment of increased state power 
(Philpot, 2001; Herbst, 2000; Centeno, 2003). Thus, sovereignty-enhancing violence 
is not particularly a feature of contemporary conflict in the developing world, except 
in instances where the state has collapsed and new organizational forms seek to 
replace it.  
 There is, however, variation in the relationship between sovereignty and the 
use of violence by non-state actors. Most instances of internal war are explicitly 
sovereignty-challenging: insurgent groups who explicitly aim to destroy the authority 
of the extant state over some or all of its territory. But there are instances of the 
deployment of violence by non-state actors that do not aim to contest the basic 
authority of the state but rather perpetrate violence while leaving the assumptions of 
the state’s overall authority intact. When religious or ethnic groups target other groups 
for the purposes of political mobilization, or when party cadres clash ahead of polls, 
they are doing so without wishing the destruction of the state; indeed, as Wilkinson 
(2004) argues, they often do so with the state’s implicit consent or active support. 
Similarly, if social groups air their grievances against certain officials or policies, and 
these demonstrations turn violent through confrontations with the police, these 
encounters are usually grounded on appeals to the authority of the state for policy 
change or group recognition within the rubric of state authority. Indeed, most social 
violence of this type has as its ultimate objective the control or influence of the levers 
of state power for their own objectives, rather than a revolutionary rejection of the 
state. For these reasons, I term this violence sovereignty-neutral. 
This is not to suggest that social violence do not have any causal impact on the 
legitimacy of the (democratic) state more generally. Indeed, when the state remains a 
bystander or becomes a participant in perpetrating violence against minorities, its 
moral authority is diminished. Further, the deployment of coercion by the state or its 
proxies is often embedded in larger and more complex landscapes of structural 
violence and victimization (Gupte, Justino and Tranchant, 2014; Gupte, 2017). For 
these reasons, sovereignty-neutral violence is at best a partial perspective on the 
complexity of social violence. Yet I maintain that the categorical distinction, at least 
based on a Weberian understanding of sovereignty, has some conceptual utility, 
because ordinary citizens and government officials alike do not perceive riot-based 
violence – unlike insurgencies – as a real challenge to the state’s monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force. 
 Sovereignty-challenging violence (SCV) and sovereignty-neutral violence 
(SNV) have specific repertoires of conflict that are helpful in coding instances of 
violence as belonging to one category or another. Guerrilla warfare and terrorism 
characterizes SCV: armed battles between rebels and security forces, targeted 
assassinations of government officials, remote bombings against government targets. 
SNV, by contrast, is largely characterized by riot-like engagements: clashes with 
other groups or police forces, including protests, rallies and marches that turn violent 
and brawling between political party cadres, as well as the more archetypical ethnic 
riots. This might also include targeted violence against civilians, forced displacement, 
assassinations of the leaders of rival groups, or even acts of terrorism aimed at targets 
other than the state.  
 To be sure, there are some grey areas. Take, for instance, the response of 
minority communities against pogroms and ethnic riots. Dawood Ibrahim’s mafia 
organization orchestrated high-profile terrorist attacks in Mumbai in retaliation for the 
attacks on Muslims by Hindu mobs in the city following the destruction of the Babri 
Masjid; the responses of minority ethnic communities to attacks by majoritarian 
groups are rarely symmetric. Further, the contexts of insurgent violence, interethnic 
tension and popular unrest enables and masks local rivalries, criminal activities, and 
petty disputes (Kalyvas 2006). Riots in the context of regime collapse and violent 
state response can indeed end up challenging sovereignty, as with the Bengali 
nationalist uprising in Pakistan before Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. 
But in the proximate context of a state in no immediate danger of collapsing, 
like India, classification of violence based on sovereignty is feasible. While there are 
certain violent incidents that require difficult judgements as to the aims and objects of 
violence, the majority of incidents can be categorized because there is a strong 
elective affinity between the aims of violence and its methods: those who attempt to 
fundamentally challenge the state would be identified and arrested quickly if they 
chose open rioting over clandestine warfare, and those who aim to take democratic 
control of or express grievances to the state through popular mobilization are unlikely 
to do so effectively as guerrillas in remote areas.  
To map these different kinds of violence, I utilize the Armed Conflicts and 
Events Database, or ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010; appendix 1). The database tracks 
violent and contentious events within countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia 
through rigorously cross-referenced media reports. Unlike other geolocated databases 
that focus on particular forms of violence, such as terrorist attacks, battle-deaths or 
riots, it includes incidents of violence and contention without distinction. In charting a 
landscape of violence across Indian national territory, I locate 4,848 incidents, with 
1,631 associated fatalities, across 630 administrative districts – county-level 
administrative units – across a two-year period (January 2015- December 2016).2 
SNV represented 83 percent of the total incidents, though accounts for 33 percent of 
the associated fatalities. The spatial distribution of each form of violence is 
represented in figures 1 and 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Incidents of Sovereignty-Challenging Violence in India by district, 2015-16 
 
Source: ACLED Asia. 
 
 
Figure 2: Incidents of Sovereignty-Neutral Violence in India by district, 2015-16 
 
Source: ACLED Asia. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 capture the essential differences in the geographic incidence of 
sovereignty-challenging and –neutral violence. The former is, as expected, very 
concentrated around the locations of contemporary insurgencies: in the Kashmir 
valley, in the “Red corridor” in eastern India, and in the Northeast. The latter is much 
more widespread, but located in areas of relative wealth in the south and along the 
western coast and the northwest, as well as areas in Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, in 
addition to the Kashmir valley and the Northeast.  
 
STATE CAPACITY, STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND VARIETIES OF 
VIOLENCE 
 
To explain the spatial dispersion of these different forms of violence across India’s 
territory, I turn to the nature of state power and the relationship between state and 
social actors at the local level. Variation in the bureaucratic capacity of the state has 
long been an important explanatory variable in explaining variations in cross-national 
social and political outcomes. In the study of conflict, low state capacity has long 
been considered a key indicator of political disorder, because weak states are not 
capable of successfully countering insurgencies, in addition to sowing the seeds of 
grievance by not meeting the needs of the population (Huntington, 1968; Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003). Scholars have further specified causal linkages between (under)-
investments in state capacity, civil conflict and violent contagion in developing 
countries (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009; Braithwaite, 2010; Hendrix, 2010; 
Besley and Persson, 2011). 
 Most of the research that links state power to social disorder is conducted at 
the cross-national level, however. In post-colonial countries, some of the most 
striking variation in the capacity of the state occurs within national borders rather 
between country cases. This within-country variation can help us understand incidents 
of conflict, particularly when differences in the capacities of the state reflect regional 
economic inequality, which can, in turn, reproduce local state weakness (Buhaug et 
al., 2009). Some important work on urban political geography has recognized the 
importance of state response to challenges of social disorder, thus locating variations 
in violence in the differential capacity of the state to manage conflict locally (Urdal 
and Hoelscher, 2012; Moncada, 2013; Fox and Hoelscher, 2015). Regime dynamics 
can additionally mediate this dynamic: under-institutionalized contexts such as hybrid 
regimes in which elite competition is not restrained by institutions can lead to both 
increased disorder and lower capacity of the state to mediate it (Hoelscher, 2015).  
For all its utility in specifying the nature of state capacity and political 
disorder in subnational contexts, some limitations are evident. The first and most 
obvious is that focusing on urban violence occludes the violence in the countryside, 
where state structures look and act differently from those involved in urban 
governance. Second and relatedly, the use of the most readily available measures of 
violence at the local level, such as homicide rates, may not be capturing the 
underlying landscape of conflict across national territory. But third, there are serious 
difficulties with measuring state capacity, particularly at the subnational level, 
because it is hard to conceptually separate the state’s often multiple, and conflicting, 
intentions, its ability to execute those intentions and resulting social and political 
outcomes (Naseemullah, 2016). 
 For this reason, I suggest that it may be prohibitively difficult to use the 
capacity of the state locally as an explanation for the various forms of conflict present 
in India today. Rather, the dynamics of governance that might produce different forms 
of violent action, response and resistance are to be found at the intersection of 
government and civil society. Variations in society’s relationship to state structures at 
a local level can thus more meaningfully explain the forms of violence that are extant 
in contemporary India; the study of such variations are part of a larger “state-and-
society” research tradition (Migdal, 1988; Migdal, 2001). Adopting an explanatory 
framework based on state-society relations rather than the power of the state in 
isolation has three advantages. First, it explores the interplay between coercive actors 
representing the state and those in social groups seeking to either challenge or capture 
it; in this, it does not normalize or excuse violence perpetrated by the state, but rather 
seeks to characterize its variation.  
Second, such relationships are in large part created by earlier investments in 
state capacity, or the lack thereof, which are often path-dependent (Pierson, 2003). 
Thus, we can see the present-day effects of previous investments in state capacity, 
even if these investments were made decades ago. Relatedly, the various regimes of 
state-society relations have concrete historical roots that are useful for understanding 
the origins of institutions that reproduce them. In India as with other post-colonial 
developing countries, many of these institutional investments were made in the period 
of establishing colonial states in the nineteenth century, building upon but also 
transforming early modern state structures. Boone (2003) developed a key framework 
for thinking about the engagements of colonial state actors with different 
constellations of social actors in sub-Saharan Africa, yielding different topographies 
of the state. Building on Mamdani’s (1994) work on the institutional bifurcations 
evident in colonial rule, the book represented a watershed for research on the colonial 
origins of political order, even though much subsequent work involved cross-national 
rather than subnational research (Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson, 2001; Lange, 
2009; Gerring et al., 2011). 
In the last decade, research on the colonial roots of conflict in South Asia has 
also mushroomed. Varghese (2016) argued that colonial governance forms may 
determine the latent potential for Hindu-Muslim violence; areas under direct British 
rule have tended to exhibit lower incidence of this type of violence than those under 
the rule of princely states, because the latter lacked institutional mechanisms to 
balance communal interests. Mukherjee’s (2013) work on explaining patterns of left-
wing insurgent violence similarly situates indirect rule as an explaining the low levels 
of state capacity that enables rebellion. Naseemullah and Staniland (2016) provided a 
conceptual typology of various forms of colonial and post-colonial rule outside of 
Weberian sovereignty. Yet the challenge for using state formation or colonial 
practices to explain contemporary outcomes is in identifying the causal mechanisms 
that might lead to the persistence, or development along separate trajectories, of 
governance regimes at the local level, while being aware of when these relationships 
change through exogenous shocks or endogenous change.  
 To that end, I delineate different regimes of state-society relations in 
contemporary India by exploring the dynamics of the initial construction of local state 
institutions in the colonial period, the accommodations, influences and 
transformations with interlocutors in civil society, and their subsequent 
transformations after independence. While this cannot be a comprehensive causal 
mapping of state-society relations, it will focus on the causal roots of distinctions 
among types of state-society relations that form different regimes of governance 
today. Specifically, I will focus on the ways that a) commerce, trade and later, 
industrialization, helped build hegemonic state-society regimes around nodes of direct 
engagement with the international economy, b) different forms of agricultural 
production and institutions of land revenue and taxation led to fragmented and 
accommodative state-society regimes, and c) logics of administrative restraint and 
geo-political competition formed hybrid and later revised state-society relations.  
Commerce and Hegemonic State-Society Relations 
 
A key object of British territorial control in India was the enabling the trade of Indian 
commodities and the creation of markets for British goods. Networks of trade 
required protective governance arrangements; their nodes were the metropolitan ports 
of colonial Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, where expatriate and indigenous 
commercial interests were located and the international economy engaged domestic 
production. Important too were cities along key routes of inland trade following 
roads, rivers and eventually the railways that could facilitate inland trade and link the 
hinterland to ports. Cities, then, provided key zones of commerce, in which the 
defense of property rights and the enforcement of contracts required much more 
durable state presence and power and, crucially, society incorporated into a state-
directed and -enforced system of political order (North, 1990).  
Due in part to the need for a legal and regulatory infrastructure to conduct 
commerce, as well as public investments in infrastructure, local governance 
institutions called municipal corporations emerged in all of colonial India’s largest 
cities in the nineteenth century. Municipal corporations offered indigenous 
representation in governance – and thus electoral competition –several decades before 
the emergence of representative institutions elsewhere. Cities like Bombay, Calcutta, 
Surat, Ahmedabad, Kanpur and Coimbatore were also locations of indigenous 
industrialization from the late nineteenth century, and thus became sites of bourgeois 
associationalism and trade union mobilization (Chandavarkar, 1996). These 
formations reflected Mandani’s (1996) ‘citizens,’ rather than ‘subjects,’ in the 
repertoire of colonial governance.  
As India became independent, cities represented the leading edge of Nehru’s 
vision for statist development – what Sunil Khilnani (1997: 63-107) has called 
‘temples of the future’ – and thus became recipients of much of the state’s resources 
in projects for state-directed development. Concomitantly, the wealth of urban areas, 
created by state expenditure and public and private investment, became an object of 
political and even violent competition, as new political forces – such as the sons-of-
the-soil Shiv Sena in Mumbai and the Communist Party of India-Marxist in Kolkata – 
engaged with bureaucrats, businessmen and mafia elements to maximize political 
power and resource mobilization. The notion that cities are governed differently than 
rural, agrarian India remains salient today. As social groups in South Asian cities are 
integrated into metropolitan governance, they increasingly demand rights and 
resources as citizens directly or through political entrepreneurs, rather than relying on 
kinship arrangements and other traditional structures that persist in the countryside 
(Heller and Evans, 2010; Chhibber and Varshney, 2013). 
 Further, urbanization and the proximity to towns and cities create transitional 
zones of governance in which those in rural areas can take advantage of urban 
opportunities while maintaining regular contact to agrarian livelihoods. Such zones of 
transition represent spillovers from the opportunities afforded by the city and the 
politics that correspond to these opportunities. Yet landed modes of power and 
authority still hold some sway. These zones of transition thus represent both 
dynamism and the potential for social conflict. But the nature of conflict in urban and 
urban-adjacent areas is usually over control over the capacities and actions of the 
local state: to whom does the government distribute resources, licenses, exemptions, 
for whom does it formulate helpful policies, whose rights does it enforce, whose 
criminality does it prosecute and whose does it ignore. Different social and economic 
groups intuit (quite correctly) that in the urban Indian context, these resources are 
zero-sum, due to chronic underinvestment in bureaucratic capacities and resources 
relative to population growth, and so groups compete with one another, at times 
violently, for the state’s attention as well as electorally mobilize to gain power over 
the state, again at times violently. But the nature, targets and repertoires of this 
violence reinforce the centrality of the state, and is thus overwhelmingly sovereignty-
neutral, with high incidence of this form of violence relative to other regimes.  
 
Land Revenue and Fragmented State-Society Relations  
 
For the vast rural hinterland of the Indian sub-continent during the colonial period, the 
state’s abiding interest was to maximize land revenue while minimizing the costs of 
extraction. This led to different zones of rural governance, with different revenue 
extraction mechanisms, across India’s territory. Wars in the south, west and northwest 
led British authorities to take control of conquered territories and incorporate them 
directly into the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras and the ‘canal colonies’ of the 
new province of Punjab, as previous rulers and their officials were deemed hostile to 
British interests and British investments created new client populations (Yong, 2005). 
By contrast, Bengal and the vast Mughal heartland in north India, eventually 
incorporated as the United Provinces and Bihar, acceded to British rule through 
agreements and compacts which left much local power intact.  
As a result, much of northern India kept at least the form of local taxation 
structures and authority through intermediate landlords largely intact, while western 
and southern India saw dramatic changes, which included the direct taxation of 
peasants or ryots by the state. As Banerjee and Iyer (2005) noted, such a difference – 
between ryotwari and zamindari systems of taxation – had significant consequences 
in the presence of the state. The latter relies on notables to maintain order at the local 
level, whereas the former requires representatives of the state to extract resources, 
adjudicate disputes and enforce order at the local level.  
In the third category of princely states, British authorities did not directly 
govern, but rather affirmed the notional independence of ‘native states’ in return for 
loyalty. In small statelets in India’s interior, agricultural production was so marginal 
that the British state may have decided that the benefits in terms of revenue might 
have not have outweighed the administrative costs of setting up local bureaucracies 
(Naseemullah and Staniland, 2016: 21). In some large and powerful states such as 
Kashmir, Hyderabad, Mysore and some states in contemporary Gujarat and 
Rajasthan, however, ryotwari and zamindari systems were established but with the 
revenues accruing to loyal ‘native’ rulers rather than the British. These different 
institutions of taxation, taken together, created a heterogeneous agrarian order with 
radically different legacies of state intervention in agricultural societies.  
 Soon after independence, the Indian state integrated princely states into the 
Indian union and passed laws abolishing the largest feudal landholdings. But the 
politics of the countryside in post-independence India were deeply bifurcated. In 
places where productivity was low and there were legacies of limited state 
intervention, traditional elites at the local level, especially those associated with 
dominant castes, used political power and social strength to reinforce traditional 
hierarchies, with the state largely accommodating the interests of a united elite at the 
local level.  
 In areas with agricultural wealth and traditions of deep state intervention, 
however, political mobilization emerged among cultivators for greater state 
engagement in defense of their own interests, in opposition to traditional elites and 
subaltern aspirants (Varshney, 1998). These politics were deeply implicated in the 
Green Revolution in northwestern, western and southern India, which enabled a 
market-based commercial revolution that vastly increased yields and enabled rich 
peasants to greatly expand their capacities, introduce mechanized cultivation and 
consolidate political power, but led to contention against those with customary rights 
to land use (Frankel, 1971). Structural agrarian transformation has given rise to 
political conflict, as intermediate castes challenged traditionally dominant elites, and 
then lower castes asserted their rights against intermediate castes (Jaffrelot, 2002). 
State power in these contexts is thus fragmented by competitive political 
mobilization, with different communities capturing power at different levels based on 
varying waves of elections. 
 Thus in the agrarian heartland of India, two different types of state-society 
relations have arisen, with consequences for patterns of violence. Fragmented regimes 
would exhibit more sovereignty-neutral violence as different communities are 
struggling for power and influence over different elements of the state apparatus, 
though it’s unlikely that this level of contention would approach that of the 
hegemonic regimes in metropolitan areas, where the presence of the state is more 
ubiquitous (Gupta, 2012). Accommodative regimes characterized by low production 
and the control of state power by dominant communities, by contrast, conflict is 
suppressed as traditional social relations are defended by unitary, quotidian state 
power.  
 
‘Standoff-ishness,’ Geostrategic Balancing and Revised State-Society Relations 
  
Administrative restraint was also a key feature of colonial governance practices, one 
that produced exceptional legal and governance arrangements, some of which have 
persisted to contemporary politics. There are several sources of this ‘standoff-ishness’ 
(Slater and Kim, 2014). State-builders recognized geographically delineated zones of 
de facto administrative exceptionalism in forested hinterlands and mountainous 
peripheries as homelands for ‘indigenous’ adivasi or tribal communities thought to be 
separate from normal caste-based agrarian society, often enforcing practices of 
separation that prevented the latter from dominating the former. Many of these 
communities were ruled under ‘native’ petty princes and chieftains rather than 
directly under British administration. This is, in part, due to relative paucity of 
revenue potential relative to the costs of governance in these forested and 
mountainous areas (Naseemullah and Staniland, 2016). But these communities also 
practiced strategies of non-incorporation similar to Scott’s “Zomia” highland 
communities in Southeast Asia, strategies that would continue after independence 
(Scott, 2014).  
 Light presence of the state was practiced even in contexts of geopolitical 
threat. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the British colonial state was 
obsessively concerned with foreign threats to their supremacy in the subcontinent. 
The greatest perceived threat was from Russian imperial expansion southward into 
Central Asia; British political efforts to ensure Afghanistan remained a buffer against 
Russian strategic designs led to three bloody wars (Barfield, 2010). French colonial 
expansion into Indochina and threats to trade routes into China proper involved 
similar if more muted strategic balancing to the far northeastern edges of British India 
(Phanjoubam, 2016). 
British political strategies toward the borderlands of its Indian empire were 
guided by a principle of governance restraint, as colonial administrators were wary of 
getting dragged into internal and external conflicts. Along with the creation of 
notionally independent and neutral states such as Burma (until its annexation), Nepal, 
Sikkim, Tibet and Afghanistan, colonial agents established tribally delineated frontier 
agencies and specially administered regions to balance the requirements of state 
presence as strategic buffers with the prohibitive costs of establishing full state 
sovereignty in far peripheries. As a result, in areas such as the Tribal Agencies along 
the Afghan border, the ‘non-regulated’ district of Darjeeling and the North East 
Frontier Agency (NEFA), colonial authorities established ‘hybrid’ rule in which 
political agents of the state shared coercive monopolies with tribal leaders 
(Naseemullah, 2014; Naseemullah and Staniland, 2016).3  
After independence, traditions of administrative restraint at borders and 
hinterlands persisted in some areas, even as exceptional governance institutions were 
formally collapsed. Much forested land that constituted the livelihood of tribal 
communities received statutory and regulatory protections that precluded sale or 
development, though the use of forest resources was the subject of continual 
contestation (Guha, 2000). Further, the government recognized tribal autonomous 
areas concentrated in the Northeast as providing explicit exceptionalism for 
indigenous highland communities (Baruah, 2005). More generally, adivasi 
communities throughout India kept legacies of internal self-governance and limited 
engagement with the state well after India’s independence.  
Tribal self-governance was a norm that relied on the relative neglect of the 
state in these areas. But in the post-liberalization period, there were heightened 
incentives for penetration by an alliance of aspirant political actors and their capitalist 
clients in tribal-majority areas rich in natural resources, thus the state’s often coercive 
attempts to revise older social compacts. Much of the conflict in eastern and central 
India involves the unilateral reversal of longstanding state policies of restraint, 
because corporations, often supported by the coercive force of state governments, 
seek to alienate land for extractive investment (Shah, 2006). These are what I consider 
revised regimes, where society actively disputes the state’s new expanded roles in 
contexts when it was traditionally distant, and are associated with high incidence of 
sovereignty-challenging violence. As argued above, state capacity is sticky and not 
easily revised: Dasgupta, Gawande and Kapur (2017) have shown that government 
social distribution programs, such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme, has been successful in restraining Maoist conflict only in areas with enough 
state capacity for programs to be implemented successfully.     
Areas where the state was traditionally weak or absent and where India feels 
its greatest threat from external powers constitute a special case. The creation of the 
independent Indian state through Partition established several strategic standoffs. The 
first and most significant has been over the former princely state of Kashmir, which 
has been subject to contestation since 1948 that included four interstate wars. A 
disastrous war with China in 1962 led to strategic standoffs to the northeast from the 
early 1960s. Unlike the colonial state, however, strategic threats have been not with 
modulated restraint but by overwhelming military presence in borderlands, where 
relationships to the state were previously tenuous, such as in the North East Frontier 
Area or the princely states of Manipur and Kashmir. In these kinds of revised 
regimes, we should naturally expect high incidence of sovereignty-challenging 
violence but also high incidence of sovereignty-neutral violence, as military presence 
and involvement in governance, even a special kind of ‘subnational authoritarianism,’ 
is likely to provoke rights-based resistance, often violently suppressed by government 
authorities under exceptional legislation.   
 
We would thus expect different forms of state-society relations to be associated with 
different patterns of conflict. In hegemonic regimes, we would expect the highest 
incidence of SNV and the lowest incidence of SNV. In revised regimes, we should 
see the highest incidence of SCV, and additionally high SNV where the military or 
paramilitary forces are regularly deployed. In agrarian regimes, we should see lower 
incidence of violence, but in accommodative regimes, we should see lower SNV and 
perhaps higher SCV relative to fragmented regimes.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
These regimes are conceptual types, of course, and would need to be operationalized 
before their explanatory power can be evaluated. To do this, I measure 628 Indian 
districts by the proportion of their urban population, the proportion of their tribal 
population, their district-level ‘GDP per capita’ and their government classification as 
‘disturbed.4’ 
Hegemonic Regimes: These are associated with metropolitan governance or adjacent 
to urban centers. I use the variable urban to classify roughly the top quintile of most 
urban districts by population, with 40 percent or more of the population living in 
urban areas by the 2011 census. These 103 districts include all the major metropolitan 
centers in India, as well as adjacent districts, such as Thane in Maharashtra and 
Kanchipuram in Tamil Nadu, and districts containing other ‘second tier’ cities such as 
Bhopal, Rajkot, Chandigarh, Surat, Vishakapatnam, Tiruppur, Lucknow, Amritsar 
and Pondicherry.   
Revised Regimes: I use two measures here. First, I categorize as AFSPA districts in 
the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya 
and Arunachal Pradesh – 105 districts in total – have been classified as ‘disturbed’ 
and thus are subject to the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act.5 These are areas with 
traditions of state distance, but in which the military has been deployed because of 
geopolitical threat. Other districts that I associate with revised regimes are those with 
a high population of Scheduled Tribes, which are facing the most jarring transition 
between a traditionally restrained state and contemporary interventions of state 
governments and allied corporations eager to alienate previously protected land. I 
classify as tribal those districts with the tribal proportion of the population greater 
than 40 percent, and are not either under AFSPA or urban, to a total of 50 districts.  
Fragmented and Accommodative Regimes: These regimes are associated with the 
agrarian hinterland, but differ in their amount of wealth and productivity. I classify as 
rich agrarian – associated with fragmented regimes – those districts with urban and 
tribal populations lower than 40 percent and with district ‘GDP’ per capita higher than 
Rs. 18,000 in 2004-5, to a total of 195 districts. I classify as poor agrarian – 
associated with accommodative regimes – those districts with urban and tribal 
populations lower than 40 percent and with district ‘GDP’ per capita lower than Rs. 
18,000 in 2004-5, to a total of 180 districts. 
 
The profile of these districts by category for incidents of violence is represented in 
figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: District-wise Mean Incidents of SCV and SNV, by category 
 
Source: ACLED  
 
 
 
Figure 3 generally demonstrates an association between the closeness or distance 
between the different forms of state-society relations and forms of conflict. In urban, 
rich agrarian and poor agrarian districts, sovereignty-neutral violence is higher than 
sovereignty-challenging violence. The mean number of incidents are higher as we 
move from poor to rich agrarian to urban districts, as the resources to contest over 
grows. By contrast, tribal and AFSPA districts have a different profile. The districts in 
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the tribal category have on average more incidents of sovereignty-challenging 
violence than sovereignty-neutral violence. AFSPA districts have high SCV but even 
higher SNV, due in large part to the presence of (often violent) protests against 
military and paramilitary activities in a hyper-securitized context.  
To further test local governance and state-society relationships in relation to 
other common explanations for violence at the district level, I fit models for incidents 
of sovereignty-challenging and sovereignty-neutral violence per district. For this 
analysis, I employ Urban, Poor Agrarian, AFSPA and Tribal, with Rich Agrarian as 
the excluded category.  
For control variables, each at the district level, I include Princely State, Log 
Density, Scheduled Caste and Literacy. Princely State indicates whether a district 
consisted of a princely state before independence; Mukherjee (2013) argues that such 
legacies are associated with higher insurgent violence and Varghese (2016) sees 
princely states as associated with higher levels of ethnic riots. Low population density 
is a rough proxy for challenging terrain such as mountains, deserts and forests, which 
are associated with the feasibility of conflict. Scheduled Caste, the proportion of the 
population in the district that are members of Scheduled Castes, reflects the 
communities that have faced the most significant caste-based discrimination, and thus 
can be used as a proxy for the salience of group-based grievances. Literacy, as the 
proportion of the district population that is literate, represents human development in 
the district; we would expect that higher human development would be associated 
with lower conflict.  
 To analyze results, I use OLS regressions in the article for ease of 
interpretation. However, as negative binomial regressions are more resilient to the 
overdispersion that is characteristic of count data, I also fit negative binomial models 
using variables specified above, as an additional check on robustness; these yield 
broadly the same results, and they are presented in Appendix 2. I estimate OLS 
models with Huber-White standard errors, clustered by Indian states (table 1). 
Table 1: Mean District Incidents of Sovereignty-Challenging and Sovereignty-Neutral 
Violence 
 (1) 
SCV 
incidents  
 
S.E. 
(2) 
SNV 
incidents 
 
S.E. 
Urban -0.25 0.64 7.28** 2.25 
Poor Agrarian -0.10     0.25 -3.88*** 0.98 
Tribal 2.20 1.22  -0.01 1.95 
AFSPA 4.90** 1.68 8.03* 3.66 
Log Density  0.69 0.52 4.92** 1.40 
Princely State 1.71 0.97 3.47 1.71 
Scheduled 
Caste 
-4.49 4.16 1.32 10.70 
Literacy -3.05 1.97 -0.12 6.03 
Constant -1.40 3.30 -25.44* 9.61 
R2 0.17  0.23  
N 630  630  
Significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
For incidents of SCV, only AFSPA districts are statistically significant, associated 
with an increase of nearly five incidents in comparison to the reference category. Both 
tribal and princely state are weakly significant (p<0.1). For SNV incidents, however, 
a number of variables were significant. Urban is associated with more than seven 
more incidents and Poor Agrarian districts are associated with nearly four fewer 
incidents, compared to the reference category. Richer and more urban regions will 
tend to have more state resources to fight over, and groups with rising social status 
through urbanization are more likely to come into conflict with previously entrenched 
elites, providing a context for electoral polarization and conflict, as with the 
Muzaffarnagar riots in 2013 (Berenschot, 2014). AFSPA has high substantive and 
statistical significance here as well, which is expected given that the overwhelming 
presence of military and paramilitary forces will generate social resistance and violent 
state response. In addition, log density has a positive effect; more densely populated 
districts are associated higher incidence of SNV.  
 There are some outstanding issues with the causal import of revised regimes in 
this model, however. Specifically, the AFSPA variable may be picking up the 
influence of tribal governance, because many of the AFSPA districts, particularly in 
the Northeast, also have large tribal populations. To see if this is the case, I fit an 
alternatively specified model which counts only districts in Jammu and Kashmir – 
‘disturbed’ districts under AFSPA, but with mostly negligible tribal populations – and 
distribute the rest of the AFSPA districts to tribal (which grows from 50 to 98), poor 
agrarian (N=210) and rich agrarian (N=194). The other aspects of the model stay the 
same, and results are reported in table 2.  
 
 
Table 2: Mean District Incidents of Sovereignty-Challenging and Sovereignty-Neutral 
Violence 
 (3) 
SCV 
incidents 
 
S.E. 
(4) 
SNV 
incidents 
 
S.E. 
Urban 0.10 0.73 7.57** 2.28 
Poor Agrarian -0.14 0.30 -3.74** 1.03 
Tribal 1.56* 0.73 1.76 1.83 
Kashmir 9.44*** 1.06 18.27*** 1.59 
Log Density 0.30 0.36 4.27** 1.39 
Princely State 0.67 0.81 1.06 1.10 
Scheduled 
Caste 
-8.54 4.89 -4.08 10.80 
Literacy -2.22 2.46 2.82 5.76 
Constant 1.59 2.45 -21.76* 10.20 
R2 0.20  0.26  
N 630  630  
Significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
In this specification, the correlation between districts with large tribal populations and 
sovereignty-challenging violence is significant, consistent with the argument of this 
article; tribal societies maintain significant distance from state actors and thus are 
more likely to challenge the state’s authority directly rather than compete with other 
groups over state power or resources. The statistical and large substantive significance 
of Kashmir is also not surprising. Other results remain the same. It is noteworthy that 
princely state, literacy or the SC percentage variables are not significant, suggesting 
that horizontal inequality, development or colonial institutions are not significantly 
correlated with incidents of violence. 
India in Comparative Perspective 
 
The patterns of association between forms of violence and of state-society relations 
have the potential to travel, but not without some modification. The analysis on India 
above confirms that incident numbers are concentrated on more urban and transitional 
governance, even though the intensity of violence remains with revised regimes. This 
seems to confirm a more general trend – pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa – that has 
seen a movement in the balance of violent incidents from internal insurgency based in 
rural areas toward urban violence (Raleigh, 2015).  
Other countries in South Asia have comparable but distinct profiles. In 
Pakistan, for example, a decade of insurgent violence has ravaged territories along its 
western and northwestern peripheries, regions that maintained an administratively 
exceptional relationship between state and society, which was then disrupted by the 
military (Naseemullah, 2014). Such distance mirrors in extremis the revised patterns 
of state-society relations in India. But unlike India, Pakistani cities have been subject 
to high incidence of both sovereignty-neutral and sovereignty-challenging violence. 
Karachi has since the 1990s been host to intense violence associated with ethnic and 
sectarian warfare, and has additionally been the site of Taliban support and 
mobilization in the 2000s. Also during the late 2000s, the Pakistani Taliban waged a 
terrorist campaign that effectively targeted sites of state power in cities throughout the 
country. Since the early 2010s, the balance of violence has shifted as sectarian groups 
such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sabaha have dominating recruitment and 
resources; this has pushed violent incidents and fatalities to the south of the country, 
and to both rural and urban areas (Zahab, 2009). 
In Bangladesh, however, violence is concentrated in urban areas. Due to the 
violent origins of the Bangladeshi state and as-yet-unresolved accusations of 
collaboration with occupying Pakistani forces between political groups, conflict has 
been centered around political party mobilization and illiberal, winner-take-all 
electoral competition (Lewis, 2011). But this is partly because Bangladesh was 
formed out of the Muslim-majority agricultural areas in eastern Bengal under British 
rule, and thus – with the exception of the Chittagong Hill Tracts – largely lacked the 
exceptional frontier regions of Pakistan or the tribal majority areas of India. In fact, 
contemporary Bangladesh has much the same general profile of violence as the Indian 
state of West Bengal; in 2015 and 2016, nearly three-quarters of violent incidents 
involved political parties. This deep similarity of electoral violence may be a 
historical coincidence, but the underlying political economy of West Bengal and 
Bangladesh, which is increasingly urban and urban-implicated in nature, leads to 
conflict over the control of the state rather than the authority of the state.  
In developing countries more generally, we see a bifurcation of sources for 
conflict. The first is the reality that the state has not established a uniform sense of 
legitimacy; there are areas – gaps, rips and jagged edges in sovereignty – in which 
political entrepreneurs can succeed in challenging the state’s coercive authority. The 
second involves the goods that come with control over the state, and thus the use of 
both electoral and extra-political means to achieve that control or maintain that 
dominance. Given increasing inequality and the deep embeddedness of social elites in 
state structures, it is perhaps not surprising that we see such divergence.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The study of conflict suffers from a problem of myopia when it confronts political 
geography. Those following the motivations, structures and practices of particular 
violent groups tend to concentrate on their habitus to the exclusion of areas which are 
peaceful or in which the character of violence is fundamentally different. Those who 
seek structural factors that enable violence do not concentrate on the networks and the 
social context that are vitally important for understanding the reasons behind conflict. 
A focus on the state, not as an abstract ideal but rather as a set of concrete and 
geographically specific organizational structures, has the ability to combine these two 
perspectives. And yet, state capacity is notoriously difficult to measure and narratives 
of state formation are at great temporal remove from the lived experience of politics 
today. We need a set of conceptual mechanisms to link the internally varied state at 
the local level and diverse modes of contemporary political violence. This article 
attempts such a framework by placing the focus not on the state itself, but rather the 
ways in which it relates to society at the local level. Variation in state-society 
relations combines historical influences and more recent transformations in the state 
to characterize the ways in which the state relates to society. Different state-society 
relations, in turn, are associated with different forms and patterns of violence.  
 This article also highlights the insights and limitations of explanations for 
conflict when rescaling from cross-national to subnational research, or when shifting 
the focus from explaining particular kinds of violence to a broader universe, 
understood spatially. Conventional cross-national explanations of insurgent feasibility 
or horizontal inequality, for example, are not as powerful in explaining incidence of 
conflict within India, without the mediating causal influence of state structures and 
state-society relations. And the deep and insightful explanations on Hindu-Muslim 
riots require some modification when the object is to understand the incidence of 
other forms of social violence as well. Rescaling and expanding the universe of 
conflict within national boundaries throws up exciting new possibilities for research 
into the spatial dynamics of violence in integrated geographies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
 
NOTES 
 
1 A third, less spatially predictive, approach focuses on the internal organization and 
external linkages of insurgent groups as a means for understanding the intensity of 
insurgencies and the cohesion or fragmentation of rebel groups (Weinstein 2007; 
Mampilly 2011; Staniland 2014).  
2 The nature of the data necessitates a cross-sectional research design; a major 
limitation includes an inability to see the dynamics of conflict over time. However, it 
does enable us to identify spatial variation in forms of conflict during a particular 
period when certain factors at the national level – the makeup of the national 
government, its broad security policies and economic conditions – are held relatively 
constant.  
3 Naseemullah and Chhibber (forthcoming) have recently examined the impact of 
these institutions, as well as their legacies in delimited state presence, in relation to 
democratic representation; they find greater constituency-level electoral 
fragmentation, even despite common electoral rules and party organization under 
areas with legacies of hybrid rule.  
4 The sequence of classification for districts is as follows: first, AFSPA; if no, then 
Urban; if no, then tribal; if no; then either rich or poor agrarian based on district GDP. 
District GDP was unavailable for districts in Gujarat; human development figures 
were used for agrarian classification instead.  
5 The AFSPA variable might lead to concerns of endogeneity, as this piece of 
legislation, which allows military personnel to act coercively without legal oversight 
in ‘disturbed’ areas, is associated with the presence of insurgent violence. However, 
AFSPA was deployed in parts of the Northeast from the 1950s and in Kashmir from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the 1980s, thus is causally prior to contemporary constellations of insurgent violence 
there, and indeed, might represent part of the reason for the persistence of violence, as 
this exceptionalism gets calcified into the nature of authoritarian governance. 
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Appendix 1: Dependent Variable Classification 
For the main dependent variables in this article – sovereignty-challenging and 
sovereignty-neutral violence – I rely on data from the Armed Conflicts Location and 
Events Database (ACLED), Asia running files for 2015 and 2016.5 For all its 
manifold virtues, this data has a limitation that are inherent in its construction and 
data collection: it relies on media reports from multiple sources, which are then 
subject to rigorous cross-checking. Because of this, the data arise from events that are 
reported in the media. As a result, violence that is unreported or underreported by the 
media will not be captured by ACLED data. Further, the broader structural contexts 
and the events that lead up to episodes of violence cannot be captured; riots are often 
preceded and accompanied by heightened tensions and spatial segregation, arguments, 
rivalries, jealousies, stone-pelting and bottle-throwing, and a battle between 
insurgents and security forces is located within a broader web of informants, 
intelligence-gathering, the forced displacement of affected communities. But this data 
can be crucially important for understanding the spatial distribution of different forms 
of violent events; this is the object of analysis in this article.  
In the following, I will explicate the coding principles used to exclude irrelevant data 
and to categorize the remaining violent events into sovereignty-challenging (SCV) 
and sovereignty-neutral (SNV).  
Exclusion 
To begin, I excluded all violent events that involved cross-border fire or shelling 
between Indian and Pakistani armies or security forces, even when soldiers or 
civilians are hurt or killed in the process. Such events, which included several dozen 
events, represent international rather than internal conflict. Next, from the category of 
“Riots and Protests,” I excluded all events that represented non-violent forms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
demonstration and protest through the interaction code of 60, which signifies 
protestors (as opposed to “rioters”) on one side and no actor on the other. Such acts 
are simply contentious; they can become potentially violent only if the police are 
deployed (thus are classified under interaction codes 16 or 61).  
 
Classification 
Classification was executed through two variables in the ACLED database: event 
type, and then interaction code. I go through each to explain classification. 
Battle-No Change in Territory: These events – usually between insurgent groups like 
CPI (Maoist) and the police or military (interaction 12 or 13), were classified as CSV, 
except in instances where the interaction codes indicate battles between rival 
communal militia (44), or between communal militia and police forces (14). When an 
unidentified armed group was mentioned, as with gangs of criminals engaging in 
shootouts with the police, I classify it as SNV unless the Notes refer to an insurgent 
group.  
Remote Violence: I coded these events based on the interaction: whether a non-state 
insurgent armed group was identified as perpetrating the violence, I would code SCV. 
Otherwise, SNV.  
Riots / Protests: After the exclusions, these were coded as SNV. 
Strategic Developments: I coded these based on the interaction: whether a non-state 
insurgent armed group was identified as perpetrating the violence, I would code SCV. 
Otherwise, SNV. 
Violence against Civilians: I coded these events based on the interaction: whether a 
non-state insurgent armed group was identified as perpetrating the violence, I would 
code SCV. Otherwise, SNV.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Appendix 2: Negative Binomial Regressions 
While in the main article, I have retained OLS models for ease and clarity of 
interpretation, negative binomial regressions are considered more appropriate for use 
with count data that are subject to over-dispersion. In the following tables, I fit 
negative binomial regression models with the same variables as Tables 1 and 2, with 
robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by Indian state.  
 
Table A1: Mean District Incidents of Sovereignty-Challenging and Sovereignty-
Neutral Violence 
 (1) 
SCV 
coefficient 
 
SCV 
Incident rate 
ratios 
(2) 
SNV 
coefficient 
 
SNV 
Incident rate 
ratios 
Urban 1.01 
(0.52) 
2.74 
(1.44) 
0.65*** 
(0.17) 
1.92*** 
(0.33) 
Poor Agrarian 0.685 
(0.535) 
1.98 
(1.06) 
-1.06*** 
(0.15) 
0.34*** 
(.05) 
Tribal 2.49*** 
(5.74) 
12.08*** 
(6.94) 
-0.46 
(0.26) 
0.63 
(0.17) 
AFSPA 3.20*** 
(0.68) 
24.77*** 
(16.90) 
0.81 
(0.39) 
2.24 
(0.87) 
Log Density 0.323 
(.203) 
1.38 
(0.28) 
0.86*** 
(.10) 
2.37*** 
(0.23) 
Princely State -.0.01 
(0.50) 
0.99 
(0.49) 
0.53** 
(0.19) 
1.69** 
(0.32) 
Scheduled 
Caste 
-3.42 
(2.05) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
1.38 
(1.14) 
3.97 
(4.53) 
Literacy -3.75* 
(1.68) 
0.02* 
(0.04) 
-1.10 
(0.66) 
0.33 
(0.21) 
Constant -0.60 
(1.82) 
0.55 
(1.00) 
-3.31*** 
(0.482) 
0.04*** 
(0.02) 
Pseudo-R2 0.10  0.10  
N 630  630  
 Significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
The first model yields results that are broadly consistent with those of Table 1; key 
differences are that Tribal, with a positive effect, and Literacy, with a negative (but 
substantively minor) effect, are significant in SCV_incidents, while Princely State has 
a new positive effect for SNV_incidents. Incident rate ratios present relatively clear 
interpretations of significant effects. For SCV, tribal districts represent 12.1 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
AFSPA districts 24.8 times the incident rate as the reference category, rich agrarian, 
respectively. For SNV, urban districts and AFSPA districts have 1.92 and 2.37 times 
the incident rate as the reference category respectively, while poor agrarian has 0.34 
times the incident rate. Princely state is associated with 1.69 the incident rate relative 
to others.  
Moving to the alternative specification represented in Table 2, we see roughly 
the same parallels between the OLS and negative binomial models, with signs and 
significances remaining largely the same.  
 
Table A2: Mean District Incidents of Sovereignty-Challenging and Sovereignty-
Neutral Violence 
 (3) 
SCV 
coefficient 
 
SCV 
Incident rate 
ratios 
(4) 
SNV 
coefficient 
 
SNV 
Incident rate 
ratios 
Urban 0.73 
(0.55) 
2.08 
(1.14) 
0.67*** 
(0.17) 
1.96*** 
(0.33) 
Poor Agrarian 0.33 
(0.46) 
1.39 
(0.64) 
-0.95*** 
(0.14) 
0.39*** 
(0.05) 
Tribal 1.50** 
(0.48) 
4.50** 
(2.16) 
-0.21 
(0.30) 
0.81 
(0.24) 
Kashmir 2.69*** 
(0.60) 
14.76*** 
(8.87) 
1.50*** 
(0.31) 
4.50*** 
(1.40) 
Log Density 0.26 
(0.21) 
1.29 
(0.27) 
0.73*** 
(0.09) 
2.08*** 
(0.179) 
Princely State -0.13 
(0.60) 
0.88 
(0.52) 
0.28 
(0.20) 
1.32 
(0.27) 
Scheduled 
Caste 
-8.36** 
(2.65) 
0.0002** 
(0.0006) 
0.70 
(1.17) 
2.02 
(2.26) 
Literacy -3.51 
(1.87) 
.03 
(0.06) 
-0.49 
(0.63) 
0.61 
(0.39) 
Constant 1.12 
(1.96) 
3.05 
(5.99) 
-2.75*** 
(-0.51) 
0.06*** 
(0.03) 
Pseudo-R2 0.08  0.10  
N 630  630  
Significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
 
 
